In the Products section the info on MagPro DNS has been uploaded.

In the Documentation section the CryptoPack 2.0 documents have been uploaded (in Russian).

The FSS licenses N 8301 C from April 29, 2010 and N 8302 M from April 29, 2010 have been issued (in Russian).

The FSS licence N 16734 from April 07 2010 г. has been issued.

In the Documentation section the MagPro CSP 3.0 documentation has been uploaded (in Russian).

From April 1 to April 4, 2010, the RusCrypto-2010 conference took place in the Solnechnaya Polyana resort not far from Moscow. In the conference along with the representatives of scientific and educational organisations for the first time the representatives of FSS RF took part.

In the Cryptography: theory and practice section Vasily Dolmatov, the representative of Cryptocom Ltd. made a report on the process of including the GOST cryptographic algorithms in the DNSSEC protocol. In the report it was said that the standartization process of the GOST algorithms for the DNSSEC protocol usage is in its final stage now, the document has been fully approved by IETF and the corresponding protocol codes have already been reserved by IANA.

The trial version of MagPro CSP 3.0 has been uploaded.

The Internet standards RFC 5830, 5831, 5832 have been published. These Internet standards are authorised translations of Russian cryptographic standards GOST 28147-89, R 34.11-94, R 34.10-2001.

This publication has been prepared by Cryptocom Ltd. as part of the global project on internationalisation of Russian cryptographic standards.

This publication opens way for wide usage of Russian cryptographic standards in various Internet applications.

The map and description to the main office of Cryptocom Ltd has been uploaded (in Russian).

Since December 7th 2009, Monday, the head office of the Cryptocom Ltd. is situated at: 14/2, Kedrova street, Moscow. Tel. (499) 124-62-26, fax (499) 124-60-96.

On December 4th, Friday, the head office of the Cryptocom Ltd. will be transfered. The office will be unavailable in that day.

Since December 7th, Monday, the head office of the Cryptocom Ltd. will be situated at: 14/2, Kedrova street, Moscow. Tel. (499) 124-62-26, fax (499) 124-60-96.

Two licences renewed:

• The FSTEK licence N 1871 from June 6 2009
• The FSTEK licence N 1872 from June 6 2009

In the FAQ section there's information about vulnerability in the TLS protocol, published 04.11.2009, and recommendations how to avoid it.

The certificates for MagPro 4.3 have been issued: by the KC1 class and by the KC2 class.

August 23, 2009 is the tenth anniversary of the Cryptocom Ltd.

The certificates for MagPro 4.3 have been issued: by the KC1 class and by the KC2 class.

In the Download section there's the 2.0.7 update for MagPro CSP issued after the Windows update XP KB968389.

The certificates for MagPro CryptoPack 1.0 have been issued: by the KC1 class and by the KC2 class.

Cryptocom Ltd. is taking part into the 21th international exhibition of telecommunitation facilities, management systems, information technologies and connection services Svyaz-Expocomm 2009.

The exhibition works from May 12 to May 15, 2009, in the Central Exhibition Complex Expocenter (Moscow, Krasnopresnenskaya nab., 14). The Cryptocom Ltd. stand is in the 2nd pavilion, 1st hall, number 21A80. The exact situation of the stand can be found here.

Cryptocom Ltd. presents at the exhibition its latest works: the cryptoprovider MagPro CSP and the cryptolibrary MagPro CryptoPack.

In the Methodical instructions section there's the manual on the TLS protocol The TLS protocol and its practical implementation. General information (in Russian).

Certification of the cryptographic security software package MagPro 4.3 is finished, FSS has given a positive conclusion, the package exploitation is permitted up to 31.01.2013.

During several months the Cryptocom Ltd. experts in association with the ICANN, ISC, NLNetLabs and NeuStar experts have been adaptating the DNSSec protocol to the Russian Federation standarts. One of the results of this work is the formulation of the project of the IETF standard and its publication.

April 1, 2009, as part of the ADE security conference there was a roundtable discussion on the actual problems of the DNSSec introduction. An ICANN representative Veni Markovsky made a report. Steve Crocker (ICANN) and Susan Wulf (ISC) took part in the discussion on the report (on telephone).

Vasily Dolmatov, the Deputy General Manager of the Cryptocom Ltd., took part in the discussion on the report. He told the participants about the joint efforts of the Cryptocom Ltd., ICANN and ISC on the adaptation of the DNSSec implementation to the Russian Federation standards and laws. The ICANN and ISC representatives highly estimated the effectivity of this collaboration.

In the Download section there's the document The TLS Protocol and its practical implementation. General information (177 Kb, in Russian) — the methodical treatise for those system administrations who need to use the MagPro CryptoPack for the TLS connections security.

Vasily Dolmatov, the Deputy General Manager of the Cryptocom Ltd., made the final report The Internet Reliability as the means of providing the critically important services at the roundtable discussion The secure Internet: the international and national experiences at Infoforum January 29-30, 2009.

In his report Vasily Dolmatov spoke about the increasing possible implications of the global Internet failures and about the Internet systems and structures containing risks of these global failures just because of their construction principles. One of these is the DNS system that is constructed hierarchically and is the only global hierarchical Internet structure.

There was contemplation of the typical risks of the hierarchical structure global failures concerning the DNS system. It was displayed that the discussed DNSSec technology implementation, while allowing to counteract some specific DNS attacks, doesn't increase but decreases the DNS system general stability.

The Internet routing information transfer system was discussed, its weaknesses displayed, and it was stated that the current attempts to eliminate these weaknessed by the PKI implementation leads to the same consequences that in the DNS case: the elimination of one specific threat means global unstability for the system.

Also it was stated that, in the current situation, maintaining the Internet efficency in the state's territory is one of the national security tasks, and the presence (or emergence) of Internet hierarchical structures whose center is situated beyond the state's limits certainly causes anxiety.